The Availability of Discovery Sanctions for
Violations of Protective Orders
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INTRODUCTION
Protective orders require protection. They play a key role in
the discovery process and are relied upon by courts and litigants
to facilitate efficient discovery and protect the parties' confidential information.' The orders, however, are only as valuable as
they are enforceable. If a party cannot fully trust that its information will be adequately protected, it will be less likely to cooperate in producing the information, thus leading to more discovery disputes and nullifying the benefits of protective orders.
Courts play the primary role in enforcing protective orders
through the issuance of sanctions.
Consider the situation of Arlin Valdez-Castillo.2 A housekeeper at the Hampton Inn, she was tasked with cleaning the
rooms of the members of "Wildlife on Wheels," agents of Busch
Entertainment Corp.3 The agents had brought animals with
them to the hotel, and the trauma resulting from having to clean
up after the animals led Ms. Valdez-Castillo to file suit against
Busch. The court issued a protective order under Rule 26,4 imposing stringent requirements on the plaintiff and counsel regarding the permissible use of materials that Busch had marked
confidential. Ms. Valdez-Castillo's attorney, freshly admitted to
the bar, sent a copy of Busch's confidential "Travel Protocol" to
The Miami Herald; his copy, for whatever reason, had not been
marked confidential. The information leaked, and Busch suffered harm. If Ms. Valdez-Castillo and her attorney violated the

t BA 2010, University of Virginia; JD Candidate 2014, The University of Chicago
Law School.
1 See Richard L. Marcus, Myth and Reality in Protective Order Litigation, 69 Cor.
nell L Rev 1, 1 (1983).
2 This example is taken from the facts of Valdez-Castillo v Busch Entertainment
Corp, 2008 WL 4999175, *1-2 (SD Fla).
3
4

Id at *1.

See FRCP 26(c).
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protective order, what recourse does the aggrieved corporation
have?
One part of any such recourse might be court-ordered sanctions against the plaintiff and her attorney for violating the protective order. In the context of discovery, courts derive this sanctioning ability from two sources: the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedures and, alternatively, the courts' own inherent powers.
This Comment argues that the current Federal Rules allowing
for sanctions in response to violations of discovery orders are not
applicable to the vast majority of protective orders in discovery.
This interpretation, if adopted by courts, would be a significant
change, considering that many courts have relied on the Rules
as sanctioning authority for some time. Though an imperfect
and temporary solution, inherent authority can work partially to
fill in this gap in rule-based sanctioning authority and ease the
transition from current practice. Ultimately, an amendment to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure specifically granting sanctioning authority for protective order violations is preferable.
As past cases suggest, parties will often ground their motions for such sanctions on Rule 37(b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, which allows for "further just orders" when a
party "fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery."7
Courts, however, have disagreed over whether these sanctions
can be applied to Rule 26(c) protective orders, though the vast
majority of courts have held that they can.8 The discrepancy
largely stems from the debate over whether protective orders issued during discovery are discovery orders for purposes of Rule 37.
This Comment aims to resolve this disagreement, arguing
that the text of the Rule-along with Advisory Committee Notes
overlooked by every court that has analyzed the issue-suggests
that Rule 37(b) sanctions may only be applied to a narrow set of
protective orders. Thus, referring back to the example, this
Comment argues that Busch could not justify a motion for
sanctions under Rule 37(b). If Rule 37(b) is unavailable, Busch
6

See FRCP 37(b)(2).
See Chambers v NASCO, Inc, 501 US 32, 41, 46-47 (1991).
7
FROP 37(b)(2)(A).
8 See, for example, Smith & Fuller,PA v Cooper Tire & Rubber Co, 685 F3d 486,
487, 489 (5th Cir 2012) (upholding sanctions against attorneys who violated a protective
order by disseminating protected information at a conference). But see Lipscher v LRP
Publications,Inc, 266 F3d 1305, 1323 (11th Cir 2001) (overturning sanctions for the violation of a protective order on the grounds that Rule 26(c) protective orders are not within the purview of Rule 37(b) sanctions).
6
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next might try to seek sanctions based on the court's inherent
sanctioning authority, which is not grounded in any statute or
rule. This Comment ultimately argues that inherent authority is
currently the proper mechanism by which courts should enforce
protective orders.
Part I discusses the background of this issue, including the
rules concerning protective orders and discovery sanctions. Part
II details the history of how courts have analyzed the issue and
outlines their lines of analysis. Part III first proposes a solution
of how courts should apply Rule 37(b) sanctions. It argues that
the evidence suggests the vast majority of protective order violations are not amenable to discovery sanctions. This Comment
proposes carving a middle path between the all-or-nothing approaches courts have taken. Namely, it argues that sanctions
are only available for the violations of protective orders that
mimic discovery orders: those that place a burden on the disclosing party, rather than the party seeking discovery. Part III then
proposes a potential alternative source of power-the inherent
authority to sanction-that courts can use to fill the gaps of protective order enforcement. Ultimately, the Federal Rules should
be amended to legitimize the enforcement of all protective orders.
I. AUTHORIZED ORDERS AND SANCTIONS UNDER THE FEDERAL

RULES
Protective orders are a tool used by courts to facilitate the
discovery process by controlling the behavior of litigants. Broadly, they include "a wide variety of orders for the protection of
parties and witnesses in the discovery process."9 It is currently
unclear what, if anything, gives courts the authority to sanction
parties for violating protective orders. The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure expressly grant courts authority to issue sanctions in
response to violations of "order[s] to provide or permit discovery."1o In addition to this explicit grant of authority, the inherent
power of courts to sanction operates in the background, filling in
gaps left by the Federal Rules under certain circumstances."

9 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, and Richard L. Marcus, 8A FederalPractice and Procedure § 2035 at 141 (Thomson Reuters 3d ed 2010).
10 FRCP 37(b)(2)(A).
11 See Part III.D.1 (giving a brief outline of the current state of inherent judicial
authority based on the most recent line of Supreme Court decisions).
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Orders under Rule 26(c)

To assess the applicability of discovery sanctions to violations of protective orders, familiarity with the underlying rules
defining these concepts is imperative. Rule 26(c) of the Federal
Rules sets out the regulations regarding the granting of protective orders during discovery.12 A court can, "for good cause, issue
an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense."S The Rule
describes eight different actions a protective order can take:
(A) forbidding the disclosure or discovery;
(B) specifying terms, including time and place, for the disclosure or discovery;
(C) prescribing a discovery method other than the one selected by the party seeking discovery;
(D) forbidding inquiry into certain matters, or limiting the
scope of disclosure or discovery to certain matters;
(E) designating the persons who may be present while the
discovery is conducted;
(F) requiring that a deposition be sealed and opened only on
court order;
(G) requiring that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information not be revealed or be revealed only in a specified way; and
(H) requiring that the parties simultaneously file specified
documents or information in sealed envelopes, to be opened
as the court directs.14
Notice that some of these actions, for example (D), specifically
restrict the party seeking discovery, while others, such as (B)
and (C), primarily direct the disclosing party. Though Rule 26
does not make the distinction, this Comment argues in Part
III.C that which party is targeted by the order and what the order commands matter in determining whether the order's violation is sanctionable under Rule 37(b).
Significantly, Rule 26(c)(2) allows a second type of order, in
addition to the protective order previously described. The Rule
states that "[i]f a motion for a [Rule 26(c)(1)] protective order is
wholly or partly denied, the court may ... order that any party

12

See FRCP 26(c).

14 FRCP 26(c)(1).
14 FRCP 26(c)(1).
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or person provide or permit discovery."r This is important because some courts have overlooked the fact that there are two
distinct types of orders authorized by this rule: protective orders
under Rule 26(c)(1) and subsequent discovery orders under Rule
26(c)(2).16 As will be discussed below, the question this Comment
seeks to answer partially hinges on the meaning of the phrase
"orders for discovery"17 under Rule 26(c)-and whether this
phrase includes Rule 26(c)(1) protective orders, Rule 26(c)(2) discovery orders, or both.'s
B. Sanctions under Rule 37(b)
The other half of the equation is Rule 37(b). The Rule outlines the available sanctions a court may impose for violations of
discovery orders.19 Again, this Comment aims to clarify the extent to which Rule 37(b) encompasses Rule 26 protective orders.
For an inquiry like this, the first place to look is the text of the
Rule. Rule 37(b)(2) states:
If a party or a party's officer, director, or managing agent
... fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery, in-

cluding an order under Rule 26(f), 35, or 37(a), the court
where the action is pending may issue further just orders.20
The Rule itself does not explicitly answer whether protective orders are covered, but the text indicates that the scope of Rule
37(b) sanctions should include whatever is considered "an order
to provide or permit discovery." What constitutes "an order to
provide or permit discovery," however, is not plainly obvious,
though the example orders cited may be helpful in determining
what fits in this group. Rule 26(f) discusses discovery conferences, allowing courts to issue orders compelling the parties to
attend in person. 21 Rule 35 grants authority to the courts to
"order a party whose mental or physical condition

.

. . is in

FRCP 26(c)(2).
See, for example, Westinghou8e Electric Corp v Newman & Holtzinger,PC, 992
F2d 932, 934-35 (9th Cir 1993), quoting FRCP 37(b)(2), Advisory Committee Notes to
the 1970 Amendment; Poliquin v Garden Way, Inc, 154 FRD 29, 31 (D Me 1994).
17 See FRCP 37(b), Advisory Committee Notes to the 1970 Amendment.
18 See Part III.B (arguing that the evidence suggests that the mention of Rule 26(c)
"orders for discovery" in the Rule 37 Notes refers to Rule 26(c)(2) responsive discovery
orders, not Rule 26(c)(1) protective orders).
19 See FRCP 37(b)(2)(A).
20 FRCP 37(b)(2)(A).
21 See FRCP 26(f)(2).
15
16
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controversy to submit to a physical or mental examination."22
Lastly, Rule 37(a) permits the standard discovery order "compelling disclosure or discovery."3
Each of these example orders either compels a party to furnish material or information-Rules 35 and 37(f)--or directs a
party to confer, make initial disclosures, and develop a discovery
plan-Rule 26(f). At first blush, it is unclear how protective orders, which for the most part restrict the party seeking discovery, fit in with these example orders of Rule 37(b). This fact
alone does not mean that protective orders are not within Rule
37(b)'s purview, however. In fact, barring a few exceptions, most
courts have found discovery sanctions applicable to protective
orders.
II. TREATMENT FROM THE COURTS
For a period of time, a number of courts allowed discovery
sanctions for protective order violations, simply assuming Rule
37(b) gave them the power to do S0.24 But those courts that have
chosen to analyze the issue generally have had three reactions
when deciding whether to issue Rule 37(b) sanctions for violations of Rule 26(c) protective orders or to uphold such an issuance. This Part describes the three routes courts have taken:
simply assuming Rule 37(b) applies based on Rule 37's Advisory
Committee Notes, categorically excluding protective order violations from Rule 37(b), and concluding that protective order violations are sanctionable based on a broad conception of what "allows" discovery to proceed.
Part II.A discusses the cases where courts relied on the Advisory Committee Notes accompanying the 1970 amendment to
Rule 37 ("Rule 37 Notes") in permitting Rule 37(b) sanctions for
protective order violations. Part II.B introduces a pair of opinions that took an alternative view: that Rule 37(b) does not cover
protective orders at all. Lastly, Part II.C details subsequent

22 FRCP 35(a)(1).
23 See FRCP 37(a)(1).
24 See, for example, United States v National Medical Enterprises,Inc, 792 F2d 906,
910 (9th Cir 1986) (allowing Rule 37(b) sanctions under the assumption, without comment, that protective order violations fall within the Rule's authority to sanction "if a
party fails to comply with a discovery order"); Falstaff Brewing Corp v Miller Brewing
Co, 702 F2d 770, 784 (9th Cir 1983) (upholding Rule 37(b) sanctions for a protective order violation without discussing the Rule's applicability to protective orders).
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cases, most recently Smith & Fuller, PA v Cooper Tire & Rubber Co,25 that repudiate this alternative view.
A. Using the Rule 37 Advisory Committee Notes
In some of the earliest cases, Rule 37(b) sanctions were
deemed to be acceptable for protective order violations. These
courts did not consider the issue to be a close question requiring
deep analysis.26 Instead, they read the Advisory Committee
Notes of the 1970 amendment to Rule 37, which were included
by the drafting committee along with the amended set of Federal Rules, as expressly including Rule 26(c) protective orders.27
The Rule 37 Notes aim to clarify Rule 37(b)'s authorization
of sanctions against a party that "fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery."28 The Notes state:
The scope of Rule 37(b)(2) is broadened by extending it to
include any order "to provide or permit discovery," including
orders issued under Rules 37(a) and 35. Various rules authorize orders for discovery-e.g., Rule 35(b)(1), Rule 26(c)
as revised, Rule 37(d). Rule 37(b)(2) should provide comprehensively for enforcement of all these orders.29
With this explicit mention of Rule 26(c), the Rule 37 Notes affirm Rule 37's authorization of sanctions to enforce "orders for
discovery," but not necessarily protective orders, under Rule
26(c).3o

In Westinghouse Electric Corp v Newman & Holtzinger,
PC,1 however, the Ninth Circuit made the assumption that the
Rule 37 Notes referred to protective orders. The case concerned
abuses that had occurred in previous litigation between Westinghouse Electric Corporation and Southern California Edison
Company, two power companies.32 In discovery, Westinghouse
made an agreement with Southern California Edison's counsel,
Newman & Holtzinger, PC, that it would provide certain docu25 685 F3d 486 (5th Cir 2012).
26 See Westinghouse Electric Corp v Newman & Holtzinger, PC, 992 F2d 932, 935

(9th Cir 1993); Poliquin v Garden Way, Inc, 154 FRD 29, 31 (D Me 1994).
27 See Westinghouse Electric, 992 F2d at 935, quoting FRCP 37(b), Advisory Committee Notes to the 1970 Amendment; Poliquin, 154 FRD at 31.
28 FRCP 37(b)(2)(A).
29 FRCP 37(b), Advisory Committee Notes to the 1970 Amendment (citation omitted).
30 Id (emphasis added).
31 992 F2d 932 (9th Cir 1993).
32 Id at 933.
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ments if the law firm would not disclose or misuse them, and the
court issued a corresponding protective order.33 After the firm released the materials to an outside law firm, Westinghouse
brought a state court suit for breach of the agreement and an
additional tort claim; Newman & Holtzinger removed the case to
federal court. 34 On appeal from the district court's dismissal, the
Ninth Circuit analyzed whether the district court had subject
matter jurisdiction over Westinghouse's claims.@ In dicta, the
court considered a counterfactual scenario: had Westinghouse
sought to enforce the protective order violation through Rule
37(b) sanctions, the court would have had original jurisdiction.36
As support for this statement, the court cited the Rule 37 Notes,
describing the Notes in a parenthetical as stating that "'Rule
37(b)(2) should provide comprehensively for enforcement of all
[discovery] orders,' including Rule 26(c) protective orders."s' But,
as noted above, contrary to the court's description, nowhere in
the Rule 37 Notes are protective orders specifically mentioned.
Yet the Ninth Circuit made this assumption without qualification.
Although Westinghouse Electric's gloss on the Rule 37 Notes
was dicta, the District of Maine subsequently used it to justify
imposing sanctions for the violation of a protective order.
Poliquin v Garden Way, Inc38 concerned an accusation of an alleged protective order violation stemming from a products liability suit that had recently settled.39 The defendant corporation,
Garden Way, sought sanctions against the plaintiffs counsel for
helping a third party obtain confidential information for a subsequent products liability suit against Garden Way, in violation
of the protective order.40 The Poliquin court granted the motion
for sanctions without considering that protective orders might
not be sanctionable under Rule 37(b). The court held:
[Rule] 37(b) grants federal courts wide discretion in patterning sanctions to respond to a party's failure to comply with
discovery orders. Discovery orders that can be enforced

33

Id.
34 Id at 933-34.
a5 See Westinghouse Electric, 992 F2d at 934-37.
36 Id at 934-35.
37 Id at 935 (brackets in original).
38 154 FRD 29 (D Me 1994).
39
40

Id at 30.
Id.
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through Rule 37(b) include protective orders issued under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c).41
As in Westinghouse Electric, the Poliquin court assumed the
Rule 37 Notes endorsed issuing sanctions for protective order violations. In this instance, the Poliquincourt used the dicta from
Westinghouse Electricpartially to justify this view.42
B. An Alternative View: Excluding Rule 26(c) Protective
Orders
Not all courts, however, have been so willing to allow Rule
37(b) sanctions for protective order violations. The first suggestion of an alternative view was featured in a dissenting opinion
in the Sixth Circuit case Coleman v American Red Cross.43 The
original dispute involved a patient, Coleman, who sued the
American Red Cross for infecting her with HIV through a blood
transfusion.< On a discovery document, the American Red Cross
forgot to redact the confidential identifying information of the
HIV-positive blood donor.4@ The court granted a protective order
to prevent Coleman from acting on this information; Coleman
violated the order when she found out and attempted to bring
suit against the donor.46 As a sanction for Coleman's violation of
the protective order, the district court dismissed her suit against
the American Red Cross after applying a Rule 37 test, while also
citing Rule 41(b)47 and the court's inherent powers as authority.48
The Sixth Circuit overturned this dismissal on account of the
American Red Cross not having proved it was prejudiced by the
protective order violation.49 In his dissent, however, Judge

41 Id at 31. (citing Westinghouse Electric and its reading of the Rule 37 Notes as
stating that '"Rule 37(b)(2) should provide comprehensively for enforcement of all [discovery] orders,' including Rule 26(c) protective orders"), quoting FRCP 37(b), Advisory
Committee Notes to the 1970 Amendment.
42 See Poliquin,154 FRD at 31, 33 (issuing sanctions under Rule 37(b) without further comment as to the legal authority for issuing sanctions).
48 23 F3d 1091 (6th Cir 1994).
44 See Coleman v American Red Cross, 979 F2d 1135, 1136 (6th Cir 1992).
45 See id at 1137.
46 See id at 1138.
47 FRCP 41(b) ("If the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with . .. a court order,
a defendant may move to dismiss the action or any claim against it.").
48 See Coleman v American Red Cross, 145 FRD 422, 429-30 (ED Mich 1993). For a
description of inherent authority and its limits, see text accompanying notes 135-47.
49 See Coleman, 23 F3d at 1096.
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James L. Ryan took issue with the court even applying a Rule 37
framework in this case.5o
The Ryan dissent made several arguments as to why Rule
37(b) sanctions are not applicable to violations of protective orders. Judge Ryan's first argument was textual:
Rule 37(b) is primarily concerned with sanctions for failure
to conduct or to cooperate in discovery. The text of Rule
37(b) refers to the situations in which it applies, and they
include discovery orders pursuant to Rule 26(f). Nowhere
does the rule mention protective orders or Rule 26(c), which
is concerned with protective orders.51
Beyond this, he argued that the test of whether dismissal under
Rule 37(b) is appropriate-including a determination of the
prejudice suffered-is ill suited to judge the harm of protective
order violations. This further reinforced the argument that Rule
37(b) is inapplicable:
In analyzing the prejudice factor of the test, a few courts
have held that whatever sanction under Rule 37(b) a district
court selects must relate directly to the prejudice suffered.
The rationale, of course, is that because discovery orders
usually apply to the moving party's attempt to procure discovery with respect to a particular claim or defense, it is
fairly easy to relate the misconduct to a narrowly tailored
sanction. If the disobedient party has refused to cooperate
in discovery relating to a particular claim, a proper and adequate sanction might include striking that claim. . . .

[M]isconduct and sanction do not coincide so neatly when a
protective order is violated. That is because a protective order rarely relates directly to a single claim or defense. Protective orders more often deal with such amorphous concerns as "embarrassment [or] oppression," . . . or broader

considerations of public policy such as not discouraging
blood donations.52
In other words, since Rule 37(b) sanctions in practice must be
narrowly tailored to correspond to a discrete prejudice suffered-like that resulting from many discovery order violations-these sanctions are not available to rectify the more
50 See id at 1098-99 (Ryan dissenting).
51 Id at 1099 (Ryan dissenting).
52 Id (Ryan dissenting).
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nebulous prejudice resulting from most protective order violations. Judge Ryan thus concluded that the Coleman majority
erred in applying Rule 37(b) and should have instead relied on
the court's inherent powers.58
The Eleventh Circuit in Lipscher v LRP Publications,Inc54
issued the first majority opinion to closely analyze this problem,
and its holding was relatively surprising. Unlike the courts before it-and unlike any subsequent court to date-the Lipscher
court held that protective orders were not sanctionable under
Rule 37(b) whatsoever..* The case arose from a conflict between
two legal publishers, Law Bulletin Publishing Company (Law
Bulletin) and LRP Publications, Inc (LRP).56 The litigation contained numerous discovery disputes, and as part of discovery
during the damages phase of the trial, the district court judge
issued a Rule 26(c) protective order "that information relating to
LRP's profits and other sensitive financial information was not
discoverable."57 Law Bulletin proceeded to acquire documents
from LRP's bank, and after it refused to return them, the district court imposed monetary sanctions through Rule 37(b) on
Law Bulletin and its attorneys, Lipscher and Kehoe.58
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit overturned the sanctions
based on its interpretation of the Rule 37 Notes. The court first
noted that the text of Rule 37(b) does not mention protective orders.5* Next, it considered the mention of Rule 26(c) in the Rule
37 Notes.6o Given that the Notes state only that Rule 26(c) "orders for discovery" are applicable, the court reasoned that it was
Rule 26(c)(2) discovery orders-not Rule 26(c)(1) protective orders-to which the Notes refer.61 It concluded, citing the text of

Rule 37(b)(2), that "a Rule 26(c) protective order is not 'an order

53 Judge Ryan additionally considered Rule 41(b) to be equally inapplicable to sanctioning protective order violations. He reasoned that "Rule 41(b) deals primarily with
motions to dismiss for want of prosecution. There was no want of prosecution in this
case; to the contrary, the problem is that the plaintiffs counsel prosecuted too zealously,
indeed contumaciously." Coleman, 23 F3d at 1099 (Ryan dissenting) (citation omitted),
citing Societe Internationale pour ParticipationsIndustrielles et Commerciales, SA v
Rogers, 357 US 197, 206-07 (1958).
54 266 F3d 1305 (11th Cir 2001).
55 See id at 1323.
56 See id at 1308-09.
57 Id at 1309-10.
5s See Lipscher, 266 F3d at 1321-22.
59 See id at 1323.
60 See id.

61

Id.
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to provide or permit discovery,' and therefore, such orders do not
fall within the scope of Rule 37(b)(2)."62 Accordingly, Lipscher
stands for the principle that discovery sanctions are categorically unavailable for the violation of protective orders.
C.

Rejecting Lipscher: Treating Protective Orders as Discovery
Orders

Though Lipscher staked out a novel position on the issue, it
did not seem to influence subsequent courts. Notwithstanding
the fact that the question now had been raised and given significant treatment at the appellate level, some district courts continued to issue sanctions for violations of protective orders without comment. 63 Others brought up Lipscher's holding before
dismissing it and following previous cases that reached different
results.64
In Valdez-Castillo v Busch Entertainment Corp,65 the facts of
which comprise the example discussed in the Introduction, a district court in the Southern District of Florida suggested a broad
interpretation of the "provide or permit discovery" language of
Rule 37 to hold that protective orders should fit within this category and thus be enforced through Rule 37(b).66 Recall that

Valdez-Castillo, a housekeeper at the Hampton Inn, sued a corporation, Busch, for the distress she suffered from having to
clean up after animals the corporation's agents brought to the
hotel.67 The parties agreed to a protective order for confidentiality in discovery.68 After the plaintiffs attorney leaked some of
Busch's confidential material to The Miami Herald, the corporation sought sanctions for violation of the protective order.
62 Lipscher, 266 F3d at 1323.
63 See, for example, American National Bank and Trust Co of Chicago v AXA Client
Solutions, LLC, 2002 WL 1067696, *5 (ND I) (holding that, based on Rule 37(b), "[the
appropriate sanction for Equitable's violations of the protective order is for Equitable to
pay to Emerald an amount equal to the attorney's fees and expenses that Emerald has
incurred as a result of the investigation into this dispute"); Frazier v Layne Christensen
Co, 2005 WL 372253, *4 (WD Wis) ("Pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2) I am imposing a fine of
$1000 for each of the four violations of the protective order").
64 See Whitehead v Gateway Chevrolet, Oldsmobile, 2004 WL 1459478, *3 (ND Ill)
(discussing Lipscher and cases that disagree with it before choosing not to follow Lipscher); Schiller v The City of New York, 2007 WL 1623108, *3 (SDNY); Lambright v
Ryan, 2010 WL 1780878, *5 (D Ariz); Lewis v Wal-Mart Stores, Inc, 2006 WL 1892583,
*3 (ND Okla).
65 2008 WL 4999175 (SD Fla).
6
7
68

See id at *6.
Id at *1.
Id.
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Since the plaintiffs attorney had only recently become licensed, and the specific copy of the document he leaked had not
been marked as confidential, the court found no bad faith in the
violation and thus refused to use its inherent powers to issue
sanctions.69 The court then turned to Rule 37(b). Considering the
Lipscher court's distinction between Rule 26(c) discovery orders
and protective orders, it stated:
It may not be entirely obvious to some why Rule 26(c) protective orders do not enjoy the protections of Rule 37(b)
while other discovery orders issued pursuant to Rule 26(c)
do, since an agreed protective order may be viewed as allowing discovery to proceed, albeit without the need to litigate
over the terms of the protective order first.70
Because they allow discovery to proceed, the court reasoned that
protective orders qualify as "order[s] to provide or permit discovery" under Rule 37.71 Ultimately, however, the court was bound

by the precedent of Lipscher and thus denied the motion for
sanctions.72
The most recent decision on the issue is Smith & Fuller,PA
v Cooper Tire & Rubber Co.73 Like the Southern District of Florida, the Fifth Circuit took the view that protective orders should
generally be enforceable by sanctions under Rule 37(b). It suggested, however, that even under the Lipscher standard, the
protective order at issue was one that permitted discovery.74 Initially, the Trenado family was the plaintiff in a products liability
suit against Cooper Tire & Rubber Company (Cooper Tire).75 Before the trial, the district court judge issued a Rule 26(c) protective order limiting who could have access to Cooper Tire's trade
secrets and other confidential information and for what purpose. 76 However, before the court reached a verdict, the attorneys representing the Trenado family "inadvertently disseminated Cooper's trade secrets and confidential information to a
number of personal injury lawyers during a conference," violating

69
70

71
72

73
74
75
76

See Valdez-Castillo, 2008 WL 4999175 at *4-5.
Id at *6.
FRCP 37(b)(2)(A). See also Valdez-Castillo, 2008 WL 4999175 at *6.
Valdez-Castillo, 2008 WL 4999175 at *6.
685 F3d 486 (5th Cir 2012).
See id at 489.
Id at 487.
Id.
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the protective order.77 The district court imposed sanctions on
the attorneys per Rule 37(b), requiring that they compensate
Cooper Tire for attorneys' fees and expenses.78
The Fifth Circuit, in reviewing whether Rule 37(b) sanctions
were appropriate, stated that "[tihe Eleventh Circuit's narrow
application of Rule 37(b) [in Lipscher] has been questioned by
several courts" and that "[t]here is [ ] significant authority in
support of the imposition of Rule 37(b) sanctions for violation[s]
of Rule 26(c) protective orders."79 The court hedged, however, by
stating that the protective order in the instant case would have
been found to be sanctionable even under the Lipscher standard
because it allowed discovery to proceed.80
It seems as though the Fifth Circuit underestimated the
narrowness of the Eleventh Circuit's reading in Lipscher. The
Lipscher court said without qualification that "a Rule 26(c) protective order is not 'an order to provide or permit discovery,' and
therefore, such orders do not fall within the scope of Rule
37(b)(2)."81 Thus, regardless of how the protective order in Smith

& Fuller encouraged discovery, it seems unlikely that the Lipscher court would have found it sanctionable under Rule 37(b).
In sum, courts have taken several different lines of analysis
in judging the applicability of Rule 37(b) discovery sanctions to
Rule 26(c) protective orders. Some courts have read the Rule 37
Notes to expressly endorse the applicability to protective orders
by the simple mention of Rule 26(c).82 Another opinion suggested

that protective orders are not sanctionable under Rule 37(b) because the amorphous nature of protective orders-and the corresponding differences in the prejudice suffered from their violations-distinguishes them from discovery orders.8* Lipscher
concluded that the Rule 37 Notes suggest Rule 26(c)(2) discovery
orders are within the purview of discovery sanctions, but Rule
26(c)(1) protective orders are not.84 And lastly, other courts have
taken an expansive view of what it means to be "an order to
77

Smith & Fuller,685 F3d at 487.
78 Id at 488.
79 Id at 489.
80 See id at 489-90 (pointing out that "no one disputes that Cooper produced thou-

sands of pages of trade secrets or confidential information in reliance on the Protective
Order').
81 Lipacher,266 F3d at 1323.
82 See Westinghouse Electric, 992 F2d at 934-35; Poliquin, 154 FRD at 31 (relying
on Westinghouse Electric).
83 See Coleman, 23 F3d at 1098-99 (Ryan dissenting).
84 See Lipacher,266 F3d at 1323.
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provide or permit discovery,"* reasoning that protective orders
can, and perhaps always, permit discovery by allowing it to proceed, rendering them sanctionable under Rule 37(b).86
III. A CONSERVATIVE APPROACH TO APPLYING DISCOVERY

SANCTIONS
While a number of courts have engaged with this question,
as outlined in Part II, they have largely resisted grappling closely with the text of the Rules and their respective Advisory
Committee Notes. In fact, courts have not even mentioned the
Rule 26 Advisory Committee Notes, a seemingly crucial piece of
evidence. This leaves open the opportunity to use these tools to
critique the past decisions on both sides of the issue and ultimately formulate a new solution for future courts to implement.
This Part tackles the question of how courts should apply Rule
37(b) sanctions for the violations of Rule 26(c) protective orders.
Part III.A analyzes the language of Rule 37(b) to counter the
broad scope that some courts have given it. Next, Part III.B
takes a close look at the Advisory Committee Notes of both rules
to suggest that there is a strong likelihood that the reference to
Rule 26(c) in the Rule 37 Notes refers specifically to Rule 26(c)
discovery orders, as distinct from Rule 26(c) protective orders.
This does not, however, altogether rule out the possibility of
sanctions for the violation of protective orders. Part III.C takes
the previous analysis into account and proposes that only violations of a narrow subset of protective orders-those that mimic
traditional discovery orders by controlling the disclosing partyshould be sanctionable under Rule 37(b). Lastly, Part III.D puts
forth alternatives, including the inherent authority to sanction,
that courts may try to use to enforce protective orders in light of
the unavailability of Rule 37(b).
A. A Closer Look at the Text of Rule 37(b)
The strongest argument courts have made for including protective orders in the Rule 37(b) sanctioning scheme appears to
be that protective orders enable discovery to take place. The text
8 FRCP 37(b)(2)(A).

86 See Smith & Fuller, 685 Fd at 489 (suggesting that certain protective orders
permit discovery). See also Valdez-Castillo, 2008 WL 4999175 at *6 (taking this notion
even further by suggesting that all protective orders are discovery orders because they
allow discovery to proceed).
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of Rule 37(b) itself, however, challenges the notion that Rule 37
sanctions enforce all orders that merely allow discovery-in an
abstract sense-as cases like Valdez-Castillo and Smith &
Fullerwould suggest.87 Recall that Rule 37(b) states:
If a party or a party's officer, director, or managing agent
. . . fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery, including an order under Rule 26(f), 35, or 37(a), the court
where the action is pending may issue further just orders.88
The Valdez-Castillo court suggested that protective orders
should be treated like discovery orders because, for example, "an
agreed protective order may be viewed as allowing discovery to
proceed, albeit without the need to litigate over the terms of the
protective order first."89 Likewise, in Smith & Fuller, the Fifth
Circuit cited the fact that "Cooper produced thousands of pages
of trade secrets or confidential information in reliance on the
Protective Order" as evidence that the protective order enabled
discovery and was thus sanctionable under Rule 37(b).90
But this reasoning could be taken to the absurd. In addition
to protective orders, the same phenomenon could also be true for
a nearly endless number of orders that most would agree fall
outside the scope of Rule 37(b). Plenty of orders are issued, even
outside of discovery, that technically permit discovery to proceed; does this mean they should all be enforceable by sanction
under Rule 37(b)? Imagine a court, at the beginning of litigation,
ordering that neither party may leave the country until final
judgment. The order is one that likely makes discovery more
convenient (for example, by making the parties more easily
reachable), even though it really has nothing specifically to do
with discovery itself. Although it is unlikely that the courts intended such a result, under the Valdez-Castillo and Smith &
Fuller interpretation, there is no obvious reason why this order
would not be enforceable by sanction as a discovery order. Surely, the courts must have had some required nexus with discovery
in mind, but where would one draw the line? With such an abstract concept, it would be very hard to separate orders that are
proximate enough to "allow[ ]"e1 discovery from those that are

87

See Part I.C.

88 FROP 37(b)(2)(A).
89

Valdez-Castillo, 2008 WL 4999175 at *6.

90 Smith & Fuller,685 F3d at 489-90.

91 Valdez-Castillo, 2008 WL 4999175 at *6.
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too remote from the discovery process. Without a coherent limiting principle, any order issued before or during discovery, no
matter how unrelated to the discovery process, may potentially
be seen as somehow affecting discovery. Thus since the ValdezCastillo and Smith & Fuller reasoning could apply just the same
to such a wide and amorphous range of orders as it would to protective orders, it is not a persuasive argument for including protective order violations within Rule 37(b).
However, the specific language utilized by Rule 37(b) makes
it so that courts need not engage in this abstract analysis of
what orders "allow[]" discovery to proceed at all. The ValdezCastillo and Smith & Fuller "enabling discovery" argument is
predicated on Rule 37(b) allowing sanctions for violations of orders providing or permitting discovery. But, looking closely at
the Rule, it does not allow sanctions for orders providing or permitting discovery; it endorses sanctions for violations of "order[s]
to provide or permit discovery."92 The use of the adjectivalparticipial phrase, "providing or permitting discovery," would
suggest that Rule 37(b) covers situations in which the order is
providing or permitting discovery, thus supporting the ValdezCastillo-Smith & Fuller interpretation. On the other hand, the
use of the infinitive, "to provide or permit discovery," indicates
that the object of the "order"-what the order demands-is that
the party at whom the order is directed provide or permit discovery. That is, "provide or permit discovery" does not describe
the effect of the order, but what the order calls on a party to do.93
This subtle distinction suggests that Rule 37(b) is not governing
orders that permit discovery in an indirect sense, but only those
where the court is directly commanding a party to provide or

FROP 37(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added).
An argument could be made that the infinitive form can also be used to describe
what the order itself is doing-for example, "an order to compel arbitration." This would
suggest that the infinitive can be used for both meanings, while the adjectival-participial
form can only be used in one way-to describe the effect of the order itself. To avoid confusion, the Federal Rules should thus be expected to use the infinitive form only to describe what the order directs a party to do and the participle form to detail an order's
effect. Rule 37 itself confirms this hypothesis. Compare FRCP 37(b)(2)(A)(vii) ("an order
to submit to a physical or mental examination"), with FRCP 37(a)(1) ("an order compelling disclosure or discovery") and FROP 37(a)(3)(B) ("an order compelling an answer, designation, production, or inspection"). If a Federal Rule means to refer to an orders effect,
principles of drafting suggest it would undoubtedly use the adjectival participle form to
avoid confusion.
92

93
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permit discovery. And barring a few narrow exceptions,9 protective orders do not usually directly order a party to produce in
discovery. This significantly undermines the argument that all
protective orders are within the purview of Rule 37(b).
B. Inferences from the Advisory Committee Notes
Interpretations in the Advisory Committee Notes that accompany amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
"[a]lthough not binding ... are nearly universally accorded great
weight in interpreting federal rules."95 The Supreme Court has
used them on numerous occasions, for example, to determine the
"purpose" of a federal rule.96 Even Justice Antonin Scalia, who
often expresses his disdain for the use of legislative history in
judicial opinions,97 has described Advisory Committee Notes as
"ordinarily the most persuasive [scholarly commentaries] concerning the meaning" of federal rules.ne
Since Rule 37's text alone is ambiguous,** the Advisory
Committee Notes to the 1970 amendment of both Rule 37(b)00
and Rule 26(c)101 are helpful in gauging Rule 37(b)'s scope and

thus are seemingly invaluable to any court's analysis of the
94 See Part III.C (discussing how certain protective orders mimic the function of
traditional discovery orders).

95 Horenkamp v Van Winkle and Company, Inc, 402 F3d 1129, 1132 (11th Cir 2005)
(quotation marks omitted), quoting Vergis v Grand Victoria Casino & Resort, 199 FRD
216, 218 (SD Ohio 2000).
96 See Tome v United States, 513 US 150, 156-59 (1995) (interpreting FRE
801(d)(1)(B)). See also Krupski v Costa Crociere SpA, 130 S Ct 2485, 2494-95 (2010) (using Advisory Committee Notes to interpret FRCP 15(c)).
9 See, for example, Bank One Chicago, NA v Midwest Bank & Trust Co, 516 US
264, 279-83 (1996) (Scalia concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("The law
is what the law says, and we should content ourselves with reading it rather than psychoanalyzing those who enacted it.").
98 Tome, 513 US at 167-68 (Scalia concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (noting that although he himself had previously used Advisory Committee Notes
as evidence of the drafters' purpose, Justice Scalia now believes they are merely "persuasive scholarly commentaries" that "bear no special authoritativeness as the work of the
draftsmen"). See also Krupski, 130 S Ct at 2498-99 (Scalia concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ('The Advisory Committee's insights into the proper interpretation of a Rule's text are useful to the same extent as any scholarly commentary. But the
Committee's intentions have no effect on the Rule's meaning.").
99 See Part III (arguing that using a broad interpretation of the text, as some courts
have, leads to absurd results).
100 FRCP 37(b), Advisory Committee Notes to the 1970 Amendment (discussing the
effect of the amendment on the scope of Rule 37(b)(2)).
101 FRCP 26, Advisory Committee Notes to the 1970 Amendment (noting rearrangements made to the Rules, for the purpose of "establish[ing] Rule 26 as a rule governing discovery in general").
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issue. Courts have attempted, with varying degrees of success,
to interpret the Rule 37 Notes.102 But, astonishingly, no court
has yet even mentioned the Advisory Committee Notes of Rule
26 ("Rule 26 Notes"), although they are perhaps the most important evidence of how Rule 37(b) interacts with Rule 26(c).
1. Limitations of the Rule 37 Notes.
The Rule 37 Notes provide additional examples of what is
sanctionable under Rule 37(b). Unlike the text of Rule 37, the
Notes do contain a reference to Rule 26(c), which has ultimately
led to much confusion in the courts. The Rule 37 Notes state in
relevant part:
The scope of Rule 37(b)(2) is broadened by extending it to
include any order "to provide or permit discovery," including
orders issued under Rules 37(a) and 35. Various rules authorize orders for discovery-for example, Rule 35(b)(1),
Rule 26(c) as revised, Rule 37(d). Rule 37(b)(2) should provide comprehensively for enforcement of all these orders.10s
It could be argued-and the Westinghouse Electric and Poliquin
courts have found-that this answers the question of whether
protective orders are included.104 These courts saw Rule 26(c)
mentioned in the Rule 37 Notes and took that to mean protective orders can be enforced by sanctions under Rule 37(b). This,
however, skims over the text of the Rule 37 Notes. The Notes do
not say that all orders under Rule 26(c) are covered, but only
"orders for discovery."105 Recall that Rule 26(c) grants authority
for two distinct types of orders: protective orders issued under
Rule 26(c)(1) and discovery orders issued under Rule 26(c)(2) in
response to denied motions for protective orders.106

102 See, for example, Lipacher, 266 F3d at 1322-23 (finding that the Rule 37 Notes
support the inclusion of Rule 26(c)(2) discovery orders, and not Rule 26(c)(1) protective
orders, within Rule 37(b)'s purview); Westinghouse Electric, 992 F2d at 935 (assuming
that the mention of Rule 26(c) "orders for discovery" in the Rule 37 Notes refers to protective orders).
103 FRCP 37(b), Advisory Committee Notes to the 1970 Amendment (citations omitted).
104 See Westinghouse Electric, 992 F2d at 935 (assuming in dicta that Rule 26(c) protective orders are included); Poliquin, 154 FRD at 31 ("Discovery orders that can be enforced through Rule 37(b) include protective orders issued under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(c).").
105 FRCP 37(b), Advisory Committee Notes to the 1970 Amendment (emphasis added).
106 See FRCP 26(c)(1)-(2) (allowing for protective orders, and, where those are
"wholly or partly denied," discovery orders).
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It is unclear which of the two types of orders the Rule 37
Notes are referring to, since that depends on which are considered "orders for discovery." Ultimately, therefore, the vagueness
of the Rule 37 Notes does little to shed light on Rule 37. The
Rule 26(c)(2) responsive discovery orders are surely discovery
orders, but are Rule 26(c)(1) protective orders "orders for discovery"? If the answer to this question were clear at this point, then
it would be unnecessary to look past Rule 37(b)'s text to the
Notes in the first place. Thus, contrary to Westinghouse Electric
and Poliquin, the Rule 37 Notes do no more to resolve the issue
than Rule 37(b)'s text does.
2. Revelations from the Rule 26 Notes.
The Rule 26 Notes, on the other hand, provide vital information regarding the classification of the two types of orders
and their interplay with Rule 37(b) sanctions.107 This makes it
107 It is worth noting that, as a general principle, using the Advisory Committee
Notes of one rule as evidence of the meaning of a different rule is not without controversy. In Libretti v United States, 516 US 29 (1995), the Supreme Court was tasked with,
among other issues, determining whether, under the Federal Rules of CriminalProcedure, the asset forfeiture provision of a plea agreement was an element of a postconviction sentence or a separate substantive offense. See id at 36-41 (indicating that also at
issue were "the requisites for waiver of the right to a jury determination of forfeitability
under Rule 31(e)"). In trying to argue that the forfeiture provision fell within the scope of
the protections given to plea agreements under Rule 11(f), the defendant pointed to language in the Advisory Committee Notes of Rule 31. See id at 40-41. The Court rejected
this argument:
Libretti seeks to use the Note appended to Rule 31 to elucidate the meaning of
an entirely distinct Rule. We cannot agree that the Advisory Committee's
Notes on the 1972 amendment to Rule 31(e) shed any particular light on the
meaning of the language of Rule 11(f), which was added by amendment to Rule
11 in 1966.
Id at 41.
Many distinctions can be drawn between the defendant's use of Advisory Committee
Notes in Libretti and this Comment's use of the Rule 26 Notes as evidence as to the intent of Rule 37(b). Taken altogether, these distinctions suggest that the Rule 26 Notes
are still very relevant. While the Advisory Committee Note evidence in Libretti "r[an]
counter to the weighty authority" the Court also discussed, the Rule 26 Notes add additional information without contradicting any other evidence. Libretti, 516 US at 41. Additionally, Libretti's Notes contained only a general principle-and may very well have
been completely unrelated to Rule 11(f). See id at 41. The Rule 26 Notes, by contrast,
specifically mention Rule 37(b).
Lastly, this all assumes that the Rule 26 Notes are being used to determine the
meaning of Rule 37(b). But what if the Rule 26 Notes are simply clarifying aspects of
Rule 26(c)? Indeed, while identifying the scope of Rule 37(b) sanctions is the larger target
of this Comment, to do so requires defining parts of Rule 26(c)-that is, figuring out
which of Rule 26(c)'s two orders are "orders for discovery." Framed like this, it seems perfectly acceptable to use the Rule 26 Notes as evidence, notwithstanding Libretti. In fact,
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all the more surprising that, in contrast to courts' wide use of
the Rule 37 Notes, the Rule 26 Notes have been simply ignored.
The Rule 26 Notes state in relevant part:
[S]ubdivision [(c)] contains new matter relating to sanctions. When a motion for a protective order is made and the
court is disposed to deny it, the court may go a step further
and issue an order to provide or permit discovery. This will
bring the sanctions of Rule 37(b) directly into play.108
The significance of the Rule 26 Notes in answering this Comment's question cannot be overstated.
The Rule 26 Notes strongly suggest that an interpretation of
Rule 37(b) as including all protective orders is incorrect. The
1970 amendment of the Federal Rules moved authorization for
protective orders from Rule 30(b) and (d) to Rule 26(c); it also
added the authority to issue responsive discovery orders, codified in Rule 26(c)(2). Prior to the 1970 amendment, there logically existed three distinct possibilities: all protective orders were
sanctionable under Rule 37(b), no protective orders were sanctionable under the Rule, or some protective orders were sanctionable under the Rule.
The way the Rule 26 Notes discuss Rule 37(b) sanctions effectively eliminates this first possibility, that all protective orders were previously sanctionable. The Rule 26 Notes describe
the application of Rule 37(b) sanctions to Rule 26(c) as "new
matter relating to sanctions."109 If Rule 37(b) applied to all pre1970 protective orders (found in Rule 30), then a mere shift of
protective orders from Rule 30 to Rule 26 should not change the
relationship between Rule 37 sanctions and protective orders;
thus it would not make sense to describe the involvement of
Rule 37(b) as "new." Additionally, the Notes suggest that the issuance of a discovery order in response to a denied protective
order is what "bring[s] the sanctions of Rule 37(b) directly into
play."11o Rule 37(b) sanctions must not have been definitively in
play when protective orders existed without the responsive discovery order before 1970. These two facts together nullify the
claim that all protective orders were previously sanctionable. If
the Supreme Court in Libretti expressly marked as acceptable the Court's previous use
of a rule's Advisory Committee Notes to evidence the "meaning of that Rule." See id at
41, citing Tome, 513 US at 160-63.
10 FRCP 26(c), Advisory Committee Notes to the 1970 Amendment.
109 Id (emphasis added).
110 Id.
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Rule 37(b) had previously applied to all protective orders, then
this amendment would not have changed how the orders under
Rule 26(c) are enforced. Nor would it have warranted discussion
in the Advisory Committee Notes. The new Rule 26(c)(2) discovery order must be introducing the possibility of sanctions in at
least some cases where sanctions were not previously available.
The Rule 26 Notes also help shed light on the mention of
Rule 26(c) in the Rule 37 Notes, which several courts have relied
on in finding that Rule 26(c) protective orders are Rule 37(b)sanctionable. The Rule 26 Notes' "provide or permit" language
describing Rule 26(c)(2) discovery orders matches the language
in Rule 37(b) and the Rule 37 Notes covering what types of orders are sanctionable.111 These revisions suggest that it is Rule
26(c)(2) discovery orders-as opposed to Rule 26(c)(1) protective
orders-that the Rule 37 Notes use as an example of a sanctionable order "to provide or permit discovery."112

This does not mean the Lipscher court was necessarily correct in exempting all protective orders from 37(b) sanctions,
however. To reiterate, the Rule 26 Notes suggest that the addition of the Rule 26(c)(2) responsive discovery order is what required the involvement of Rule 37(b) sanctions, whether or not
they mattered at all previously. The Notes also show that the
Rule 37 Notes refer to Rule 26(c)(2) discovery orders as an example, but do not discuss Rule 26(c)(1) protective orders. While
this evidence severely weakens the case that all protective orders are enforceable through discovery sanctions, it does not
preclude the possibility that some protective orders are included
in the scope of Rule 37(b). The lists of examples provided by Rule
37(b) and its Notes, after all, are not exhaustive.113 This concept,
unlike that put forth by Lipscher, leaves the door open to include
some protective orders under the purview of Rule 37(b). Part
III.C proposes how to determine which protective orders qualify.

111 See FROP 26(c), Advisory Committee Notes to the 1970 Amendment; FRCP
37(b), Advisory Committee Notes to the 1970 Amendment.
112 FRCP 37(b), Advisory Committee Notes to the 1970 Amendment.
113 There is little question that the drafters did not intend the Rule 37(b) list to be
exhaustive. Interpreting the lists as exhaustive would lead to an extremely narrow construction of Rule 37(b). Moreover, since the Rule 37 Notes provide additional examples of
sanctionable orders beyond those listed in the Rule itself, the list from Rule 37(b) cannot
be exhaustive.
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C. When Protective Orders Are Also Discovery Orders
If one accepts that Rule 26(c)(2) discovery orders are the only Rule 26(c) orders that are assuredly sanctionable under Rule
37(b), but that some protective orders may also be enforced by
sanctions, the question then becomes which protective orders also qualify? Returning to the text of Rule 37(b), the answer is
clear: the protective orders that are "order[s] to provide or permit discovery.""u

Since this descriptor applies to discovery orders like those
authorized by Rule 26(c)(2)15 and Rule 37(a),116 these orders can

be used as guidelines for assessing which Rule 26(c)(1) protective orders are also enforceable through sanctions. A look at
Rule 37(a), the discovery order rule, suggests certain attributes
that are typical of discovery orders. The most important factorand most useful for judging protective orders-is the fact that
discovery orders are issued to compel the disclosing party to
provide materials or cooperate in discovery.117 This is in contrast
to most types of protective orders, which protect the disclosing
party and place limitations on what the receiving party can access in discovery."18 This distinction is the key to measuring the
114

FRCP 37(b)(2)(A).

115 See Part III.B (interpreting the Rule 26 Notes to find that the Rule 37 Notes refer to Rule 26(c)(2) responsive protective orders as having their violations sanctionable
under Rule 37(b)).
116 The text of Rule 37(b) and the Rule 37 Notes specifically mention traditional
Rule 37(a) discovery orders as sanctionable under Rule 37(b). See FRCP 37(b)(2)(A) ("If a
party or a party's officer, director, or managing agent . .. fails to obey an order to provide
or permit discovery, including an order under Rule 26(f), 35, or 37(a), the court where the
action is pending may issue further just orders."); FRCP 37(b), Advisory Committee
Notes to the 1970 Amendment ("The scope of Rule 37(b)(2) is broadened by extending it
to include any order 'to provide or permit discovery,' including orders issued under Rules
37(a) and 35.').
117 See FRCP 37(a)(3)(A)-(B) (describing available motions for discovery orders
against disclosing parties, such as those compelling the release of materials and responses to other discovery requests).
u's See FRCP 26(c)(1)(A)-(H). Recall the eight different ways a protective order can
direct a party:
(A) forbidding the disclosure or discovery;
(B) specifying terms, including time and place, for the disclosure or discovery;
(C) prescribing a discovery method other than the one selected by the party
seeking discovery;
(D) forbidding inquiry into certain matters, or limiting the scope of disclosure
or discovery to certain matters;
(E) designating the persons who may be present while the discovery is conducted;
(F) requiring that a deposition be sealed and opened only on court order;
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extent to which Rule 37(b) sanctions apply to Rule 26(c)(1) protective orders.
Thus, identifying Rule 26(c)(1) protective orders enforceable
by sanctions necessitates looking at a given order's substance,
rather than its form. A Rule 26(c)(1) "protective order" that, in
substance, operates exactly like a discovery order should be
treated as one for the purposes of Rule 37(b) sanctions. Given
that discovery orders are "order[s] to provide or permit discovery"119 under Rule 37(b), this principle entails treating protective

orders that are substantively designed to "provide or permit discovery" as sanctionable.
There is precedent for this sort of analogy. When interpreting other provisions of the Federal Rules, courts have recognized
that the substance of an action, rather than its form or label, determines the rule under which it should be analyzed. In Obriecht
v Raemisch,120 the Seventh Circuit issued the most recent decision in a line of cases considering whether a given motion for reconsideration should be analyzed under Rule 59(e)121 or Rule
60(b).122 After the district court granted summary judgment for
the defendants, the plaintiff filed two motions for reconsideration due to alleged errors of law, and both were denied. He had
labeled them as Rule 60(b) motions, so the court used this Rule
in deciding whether to overturn the judgment.123 On appeal, the
Seventh Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment but
determined that the motions for reconsideration had been analyzed using the wrong standard.124 The court found that the
proper characterization of a motion for reconsideration "depends
on the substance of the motion, not on the timing or label affixed
to it."125 Since legal error is typically covered by a motion for
reconsideration under Rule 59(e) rather than Rule 60(b), the
(G) requiring that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or
commercial information not be revealed or be revealed only in a specified way; and
(H) requiring that the parties simultaneously file specified documents or information in sealed envelopes, to be opened as the court directs.
119 FRCP 37(b)(2)(A).
120 517 F3d 489 (7th Cir 2008).
121 See FRCP 59(e) (allowing "[a] motion to alter or amend a judgment").
122 See FRCP 60(b) (offering the reasons for which a court can relieve a party from
final judgment, including mistake, new evidence, and fraud).
123 Obriecht, 517 F3d at 492 (describing the motions and the supporting materials
that Obriecht submitted).
124 See id at 493-94 ('[E]ven construing his motion as a motion under Rule 59(e),
Mr. Obriecht cannot prevail.").
125 Id at 493, citing Borrerov City of Chicago,456 F3d 698, 701-02 (7th Cir 2006).
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court held that the plaintiffs motions should be construed as
such and held them to that Rule's legal standard.
The same emphasis on substance over form is applicable
here. Protective orders that compel the disclosing party rather
than protect it are essentially, in substance, discovery orders.
Though not facing a protective order like this, the Lipscher
court's analysis overlooked the possibility of Rule 37(b) applying
to this subset of protective orders. Of the types of protective orders enumerated by Rule 26(c)(1),126 the most common of these
quasi-discovery orders would be orders "specifying terms, including time and place, for the disclosure or discovery"127 or orders
"prescribing a discovery method other than the one selected by
the party seeking discovery."128 These closely resemble normal

discovery orders. They grant the disclosing party minimal protection, and in prescribing a discovery method, they function like
a traditional discovery order-albeit one that orders production
in a manner different than what the receiving party originally
sought.
For example, imagine a plaintiff seeking a deposition of a
defendant-corporation's CEO. A court might grant the defendant's motion for a protective order under Rule 26(c)(1), specifying that, rather than being deposed, the CEO will instead be required to answer interrogatories. At this point, the order to
answer interrogatories is basically a normal discovery order directing production by the defendant, even though it is styled as
a protective order. If the CEO then refuses to answer the interrogatories, thus violating the "protective order," the violation
would be sanctionable under Rule 37(b).
This model also satisfies the concerns Judge Ryan articulates in his Coleman dissent.129 Recall that one of his justifications for the wholesale exclusion of protective orders was their
"amorphous" nature and the more abstract harm that results
from their violation, which makes them unlike discovery orders.
He argued that this makes protective orders unfit for the test
associated with Rule 37(b), requiring proportionality between a

126 See FRCP 26(c)(1)(A)-(H). See also text accompanying notes 12-14; note 118 and
accompanying text (enumerating the types of protective orders authorized by Rule
26(c)(1)).
127 FRCP 26(c)(1)(B).
128 FRCP 26(c)(1)(C).
129 See Coleman, 23 F3d at 1099 (Ryan dissenting) (arguing that Rule 37(b) does not
apply to protective orders).
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sanction and the specific prejudice suffered from an order violation.130
Protective orders that substantively function like discovery orders, however, do not suffer from this problem. These are not the
typical protective orders that protect the disclosing party, which
are often concerned with concepts like "embarrassment" or "oppression."131 Rather, these protective orders are commanding a
party actually to provide information. Thus, this reading of Rule
37(b) and application of Obriecht fits within Judge Ryan's understanding of what should be sanctionable.
In sum, a court examining the text of Rule 37 and the pair
of Advisory Committee Notes should find that Rule 37(b) discovery sanctions are not available for the majority of Rule 26(c) protective orders. There are, however, certain narrow categories of
protective orders that should be enforceable through Rule 37(b):
those that mimic normal discovery orders. The narrowness of
this category leaves a large gap in rule-based sanctioning authority to enforce protective orders.
D. Alternatives for Courts to Enforce Protective Orders
If, as this Comment proposes, Rule 37(b) provides inadequate authority for courts to sanction parties for violations of all
but a narrow subset of Rule 26(c) protective orders, then how are
courts supposed to enforce traditional protective orders? Another
source of authority, the courts' inherent power to sanction, can
temporarily fill in the gap. This change in sanctioning authority
should lead to similar results in most individual cases, though it
is an open question whether some marginal cases may be treated differently under the two regimes. However, such a change is
only a stopgap. Rule-based sanction authority is ultimately preferable to the inherent powers for numerous reasons.
The inherent judicial sanctioning power, like Rule 37, gives
courts a range of potential responses when facing a violation of a
court order.132 The Supreme Court has limited the availability of
130 Id (discussing the "prejudice" analysis). See also text accompanying note 52 (detailing why protective orders do not fit neatly within the Rule 37(b) sanctioning framework).
131 See Coleman, 23 F3d at 1099 (Ryan dissenting) (identifying, in addition to these
"amorphous concerns," as the usual object of protective orders "broader considerations of
public policy").
132 Compare Daniel J. Meador, Inherent JudicialAuthority in the Conduct of Civil
Litigation, 73 Tex L Rev 1805, 1815-16 (1995) (describing the inherent authority to
sanction as allowing contempt, fines, fee shifting, dismissal, and default judgment, as
well as "[1]esser sanctions ... includ[ing] warnings, formal reprimands, placement of the
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the more severe inherent power sanctions-like shifting attorney's fees-in certain cases, such as when the violation was not
willful or in bad faith1** This would seem to differentiate inherent authority from Rule 37(b), which on its face has no state-ofmind restrictions on its sanctions. Rule 37(b), however, has been
given similar limiting treatment by courts in a number of cases,134 leaving it open whether certain violations are sanctionable
under Rule 37(b) though not sanctionable under the inherent
powers. Ultimately, however, it would be worthwhile to amend
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to specifically grant courts
rule-based authority to deal properly with all protective order
violations, so as not to have to rely on unwritten judicial authority.
1. Using the court's inherent power to sanction.
A court order must be enforceable by a court; otherwise, the
order is idle words on a page, a mere suggestion that litigants
may freely disregard. Accordingly, regardless of whether there is
rule-based authority to enforce a particular order, courts can
generally do so anyway. This is where the inherent power to
sanction comes into play.
A court's inherent authority, or inherent power, is "the authority of a trial court ... to control and direct the conduct of

civil litigation without any express authorization in a constitution, statute, or written rule of court."135 This includes not only
the ability to dismiss a claim or issue a default judgment in response to an order violation, but also to fine parties, shift fees
and costs, and hold parties in contempt.3 6 In addition, the court
can impose less severe sanctions, like issuing warnings or admonitions, decreasing a case's priority on the docket, forcing
case at the bottom of the calendar list, temporary suspension of counsel, . . . dismissal of
the suit unless new counsel is secured, and preclusion of claims or defenses"), with FRCP
37(b)(2)(A)(i)-(vii) (authorizing sanctions including making negative inferences, striking
pleadings, dismissing a case, issuing default judgment against a defendant, and holding
the violating party in contempt).
133 See notes 139-63 and accompanying text (discussing Alyeska Pipeline Service Co
v Wilderness Society, 421 US 240 (1975); Roadway Express, Inc v Piper, 447 US 752
(1980); and Chambers v NASCO, Inc, 501 US 32 (1991)).
134 See Part III.D.2 (discussing the limitations courts have imposed on certain Rule
37(b) sanctions based on a characterization of the violator's conduct).
135 Meador, 73 Tex L Rev at 1805 (cited in note 132). See also Degen u United States,
517 US 820, 827 (1996); Link v Wabash Railroad Co, 370 US 626, 630-31 (1962).
136 Meador, 73 Tex L Rev at 1815 (cited in note 132) (noting that "[1]itigation-ending
sanctions ... although generally acknowledged to be within a court's inherent power []
are considered the most drastic type of sanctions). See also Degen, 517 US at 827-28.
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parties to change their counsel, and precluding specific claims
and defenses.57
While the concept of inherent powers has existed for centuries,138 the Supreme Court has further developed and clarified
the law on the inherent power to sanction in a relatively recent
line of cases. While courts have naturally been able to sanction
for bad-faith or willful violations-blatant disrespect and disregard of a court's authority-the power with regard to good-faith
violations is more nuanced. The Court briefly discussed the
sanctioning power in a discussion of shifting attorney's fees in
Alyeska Pipeline Services Co v Wilderness Society.'39 In dicta
specifying exceptions to the American Rule, under which each of
the parties pays for its own legal fees, the Court stated that
courts have the "inherent power" to award attorney's fees for the
"willful disobedience of a court order" or "when the losing party
has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive
reasons."140 This has since been established as the settled rule.141
Subsequently, in Roadway Express, Inc v Piper,142 the Court
reviewed sanctions imposed against the plaintiffs counsel for
stalling the court's proceedings, failing to respond to interrogatories, and violating the court's orders.143 On appeal from the appellate court's reversal of the attorney's fees sanctions, the Supreme Court touched on the question of "what sanctions may be
imposed on lawyers who unreasonably extend court proceedings."44 After holding that Rule 37 could justify sanctions, it further held that the inherent power to sanction could be used if

137 Meador, 73 Tex L Rev at 1816 (cited in note 132) (observing that the more severe
litigation-ending sanctions should only be used when these lesser sanctions are "deemed
[in]adequate under the circumstances"). See Degen, 517 US at 828 (seeking an alternative sanction in a criminal flight case on the ground that "disentitlement is too blunt an
instrument').
138 See, for example, United States v Hudson and Goodwin, 11 US (7 Cranch) 32,
33-34 (1812) ("Certain implied powers must necessarily result to our Courts of justice
from the nature of their institution.").

139 421 US 240 (1975).

Id at 258-59 (quotation marks and citations omitted).
See Hutto v Finney, 437 US 678, 689 & n 14 (1978) (collecting cases) (noting that
it is a "settled rule that a losing litigant's bad faith may justify an allowance of fees to
the prevailing party"), citing Alyeska, 421 US at 258-59.
142 447 US 752 (1980).
143 Id at 755-57 (noting that the lower court "found justification for its ruling in the
confluence of several statutes").
144 Id at 757.
140
141
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there was a finding of bad faith.145 Stating that "[tihere are ample grounds for recognizing [ ] that in narrowly defined circumstances federal courts have inherent power to assess attorney's
fees against counsel,"14e the Roadway Express Court confirmed
what it had stated in dicta in Alyeska Pipeline: that inherentpower sanctions could be issued in cases of bad-faith or willful
violations of orders.147
The Supreme Court later clarified the scope of a court's inherent power to sanction-and defined its relationship with
rule-based sanctioning authority-in Chambers v NASCO, Inc.14s
In litigation following the failed sale of a television station, the
defendant Chambers and his counsel took numerous steps to obstruct the proceedings and resist the jurisdiction of the court.149
In determining whether to issue sanctions, the district court
found that the misbehaviors of Chambers and his lawyer were
covered neither by Rule 11,15o which only reaches papers that are
filed, nor by 28 USC § 1927,51 which only allows the sanctioning
of attorneys but not the parties themselves.152 The court instead
used its inherent powers to make them pay nearly $1 million in
attorney's fees and expenses.153 These sanctions were upheld at
the appellate level, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
determine the legality of assessing attorney's-fees sanctions

145 See id at 763-67 (remanding for determination of recovery under Rule 37 and for
consideration of whether the violations were "tantamount to bad faith").
146 Roadway Express, 447 US at 765.
147 See id at 766 (reasoning that the expenses could be assessed against litigants
and their counsel alike).
148 501 US 32 (1991) (noting that the rules and statutes, "taken alone or together,
are not substitutes for the inherent power").
149 Id at 35-41 (noting that the defendant continued obstructionist tactics despite
warnings from the court).
150 FRCP 11(c) ("If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court
determines that [Rule 11's requirement that filed papers be certified] has been violated,
the court may impose an appropriate sanction on any attorney, law firm, or party that
violated the rule or is responsible for the violation.").
151

28 USC § 1927:

Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the
United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in
any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy
personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred
because of such conduct.
152 Chambers, 501 US at 41 (explaining the district court's reasoning).
153 Id at 40 (noting that the district court opinion provided an "extensive opinion recounting what it deemed to have been sanctionable conduct").
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under the authority of inherent powers when a party's bad-faith
conduct falls outside the defined rules authorizing sanctions.'"
The Chambers Court "discern[ed] no basis for holding that
the sanctioning scheme of the statute and the rules displaces the
inherent power to impose sanctions for [] bad-faith conduct."155
The inherent power could operate concurrently because it is
"both broader and narrower than other means of imposing sanctions."156 On one hand, it fills in the gaps when these other rules
are limited to certain parties and behaviors; on the other hand,
sanctions like fee shifting, in violation of the American Rule, are

limited "to cases in which a litigant has engaged in bad-faith
conduct or willful disobedience of a court's orders," whereas
many Federal Rules are not limited in this way.157 It is with
these properties that the inherent power to sanction operates
alongside Rule 37(b)'s sanctioning authority-it covers some areas that the Rule does not, but part of the authority may be limited in cases of good-faith or nonwillful violations.
The interpretation of these Supreme Court decisions has not
been clear-cut, and there has been much subsequent confusion
over the extent of inherent powers when facing these particular
good-faith or nonwillful violations.158 If a violation is in bad faith,
no level of sanctions is off the table. Whether a particular sanction is available for good-faith or nonwillful violations, however,
depends on the severity of that sanction. Minimal sanctions, like
a small fine or admonition, likely do not require a bad-faith or
willful violation.e On the other hand, as discussed above, attorney's-fee shifting and dismissal do require the violator to have
had a culpable state of mind. 160
The medium sanction, contempt, is where courts have wavered. One Ninth Circuit panel, for example, found that the Supreme Court was not referring to situations of contempt, so that
154 See id at 42 (noting that the Court granted certiorari "[b]ecause of the importance of these issues"). See also NASCO, Inc v Calcasieu Television and Radio, Inc,
894 F2d 696, 702-03 (5th Cir 1990).
155 Chambers, 501 US at 46.
156 Id.
157 Id at 46-47.
HS See United States v Seltzer, 227 F3d 36, 41 (2d Cir 2000) (collecting cases).
159 See id at 41-42 (noting that a $350 fine for an attorney who violated an order
without bad faith by returning late from lunch for the reading of a verdict was not problematic, but reversing the decision because the record was insufficient).
160 See Chambers, 501 US at 46-47 (comparing the limitation on courts' ability to
use inherent powers to assess attorney's fees with the use of other mechanisms, like
FRCP 11).
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if a good-faith violating party were held in contempt, the court
could shift fees as a sanction in violation of the American Rule.161
On the other hand, another Ninth Circuit panel held that alt.
hough "contempt need not be willful, and there is no good faith
exception to the requirement of obedience to a court order . . . a
person should not be held in contempt if his action appears to be
based on a good-faith and reasonable interpretation of the
court's order."162 A full analysis of the relationship between good
faith and contempt sanctions is beyond the scope of this Comment. It is sufficient to note that bad-faith and willful protective
order violations would be fully sanctionable under the inherent
powers, while some types of severe sanctions might be unavailable in cases of good-faith and nonwillful violations.
2. Similar restrictions on Rule 37(b) sanctioning.
That the inherent powers are restricted in this way may
arouse fears that sole reliance on them for enforcing protective
orders might be limiting, as compared to using Rule 37(b). Part
of this is mitigated by the fact that some courts already opt to
use inherent sanctions like contempt orders for enforcement, rather than Rule 37(b).163 Further, courts have also limited Rule

37(b) in many of the same ways as the inherent powers, which
raises the possibility that the respective reaches of the two authorities might actually be coterminous.
While the discretion of district courts to issue Rule 37(b)
sanctions is generally broad, it is "not limitless,"164 despite a lack
of restrictions listed in the text of the Rule. Like inherent power
sanctions, "although Rule 37(b) applies to all failures to comply,
whether wilful or not, the presence or lack of good faith in the

161 Perry v O'Donnell, 759 F2d 702, 704-06 (9th Cir 1985) (describing the purpose of
civil contempt as being "remedial").
162 In re Dual-Deck Video Cassette Recorder Antitrust Litigation, 10 F3d 693, 695
(9th Cir 1993) (emphasis added) (citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted). See
also Food Lion, Inc v United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, AFLCIO-CLC, 103 F3d 1007, 1017-18 (DC Cir 1997) ('Although a party's good faith may be
a factor in determining whether substantial compliance occurred, and may be considered
in mitigation of damages, good faith alone is not sufficient to excuse contempt.').
163 See, for example, Grove Fresh Distributors,Inc v John Labatt Ltd, 888 F Supp
1427, 1447 (ND Ill 1995) (holding a party in civil and criminal contempt for willfully violating a protective order).
164 Bon Air Hotel, Inc v Time, Inc, 376 F2d 118, 119-22 (5th Cir 1967) (finding that
a district court erred by imposing overly harsh sanctions when it dismissed plaintiffs
complaint because the plaintiff was unable to produce a witness for deposition).
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parties is relevant to ... the severity of the sanctions."6 Appli-

cation of this concept is similarly complicated and differs among
circuits. It is nearly universal that the severest of sanctions under Rule 37(b), like dismissal of a case, are limited to bad-faith
or willful violations of orders.166 Numerous courts have also been
unwilling to shift attorney's fees and costs under Rule 37(b)
when facing good-faith or nonwillful discovery order violations.167 At least one circuit, on the other hand, has held that
"only in a case where the court imposes the most severe sanction-default or dismissal-is a finding of willfulness or bad
faith failure to comply necessary."168 Thus, since the overlap of
Rule 37(b) and inherent powers is unclear, it is likewise uncertain whether a shift to reliance on inherent authority would restrict the sanctioning ability of courts.
3. A preference for rule-based sanctions.
Notwithstanding this question mark, even if the inherent
authority to sanction can justify enforcement of protective orders
without the need for Rule 37(b), it is preferable to expressly allow sanctions for all protective order violations in a rule. There
are numerous reasons why codifying the authority would best
serve courts and litigants alike. First, judges could be confident
166 Id at 122, citing Societe Internationalepour ParticipationsIndustrielles et Commerciales, SA v Rogers, 357 US 197, 207 (1958).
166 See, for example, Toma v City of Weatherford, 846 F2d 58, 61-62 (10th Cir 1988)
(holding that a dismissal sanction was an abuse of discretion when the order violator's
actions were not deemed to be willful); F)elstad v American Honda Motor Co, Inc, 762
F2d 1334, 1337 (9th Cir 1985), quoting Sigliano v Mendoza, 642 F2d 309, 310 (9th Cir
1981) ("Where the drastic sanctions of dismissal or default are imposed, however, the
range of discretion is narrowed and the losing party's non-compliance must be due to
willfulness, fault, or bad faith."); Savola v Webster, 644 F2d 743, 746 (8th Cir 1981) (discussing how, in the past, the court has found "'willfulness' as an element required to uphold dismissal of a suit). Note that these cases refer to dismissal as a sanction. Courts
can, of course, dismiss a plaintiffs suit for failure to prosecute, regardless of an express
finding of bad faith. See M & H Cosmetics, Inc v Alfin Fragrances,Inc, 102 FRD 265, 267
(EDNY 1984) (dismissing a case after the plaintiff "made no move to press this action
over the course of seventeen months").
167 See, for example, Vollert v Summa Corp, 389 F Supp 1348, 1352 (D Hawaii 1975)
(holding that awarding costs is unjustified without a finding of bad faith); M & H Cosmetics, 102 FRD at 267 (finding that, even if dismissal was warranted for failure to prosecute, attorney's fees should not be shifted under Rule 37(b) since the plaintiffs incomplete answering of interrogatories was due to a lack of case preparation and not
willfulness or bad faith).
168 BankAtlantic v Blythe Eastman Paine Webber, Inc, 12 F3d 1045, 1049 (11th Cir
1994) (upholding sanctions without evidence of bad faith because only the most severe
sanctions require bad faith).
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in their selection of a singular source of authority to enforce protective orders, decreasing the administrative costs of having to
choose and lowering the chance that the sanctions get overturned on appeal. Next, litigants could better know what to expect should they violate a protective order.169 If the potential for
sanctions is meant to serve as a deterrent for violations, then
knowledge of what exactly these sanctions could entail would
best deter would-be violators.170
Additionally, enumerating the sanctions could increase faith
in the judicial system and give the court's actions more legitimacy. 17 ' The inherent powers have been referred to as a "shadowy
concept,"172 one which operates in the background of the judicial
system. Consider Professor Maurice Rosenberg's prescient description of the perils of relying on inherent powers to fill in the
gaps of Rule 37 in his 1958 article:
There is no justification for the courts' practice of bypassing
rule 37, and the practice can only cause trouble. So important a mechanism as discovery should rest upon a coherent and integrated foundation of enforcing power. Areas not
reached by rule 37 should be covered, not by piecemeal decision, but by systematic overhaul of the rule.173
Related to this idea, from a rulemaking perspective, express
sanctioning authority would give both courts and legislators
more power to tailor the law specifically to protective order violations. The inherent powers are broad and cover many actions
of a court; they are far broader than any authority Rule 37(b)
provides. If a court's ability to sanction for protective order
169 See Timothy Meyer, Codifying Custom, 160 U Pa L Rev 995, 1003-04 (2012) (discussing the role of codification in clearly "delineating" the boundaries of a "legal obligation" in the context of international law).
170 See Sandra L. DeGraw and Bruce W. Burton, Lawyer Discipline and "Disclosure
Advertising" Towards a New Ethos, 72 NC L Rev 351, 373 n 108 (1994) ("Deterrence of
sanctionable behavior depends not only on clear guidelines for attorney behavior, but
also on dissemination of information. On this score, the educational effects of Rule 11 are
palpable."), quoting Thomas E. Willging, The Rule 11 Sanctioning Process 12 (Federal
Judicial Center 1988).
171 Barbara C. Salken, To Codify or Not to Codify-That Is the Question: A Study of
New York's Efforts to Enact an Evidence Code, 58 Brooklyn L Rev 641, 645 (1992) (describing the "perception" in the era before codification "that the law was inaccessible and
uncertain"), citing Jeremy Bentham, Theory of Legislation 92-95 (Oceana 1975) (Richard
Hildreth, trans).
172 Maurice Rosenberg, Sanctions to Effectuate PretrialDiscovery, 58 Colum L Rev
480, 485 (1958).

173 Id at 486.
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violations falls within this large umbrella, then changes to the
umbrella may also have unintended consequences on the ability
of courts to sanction for protective order violations. On the other
hand, if a legislative body or courts want to change the way that
protective orders are enforced, they can make rulings or changes
to the specific rule in question.'74
A change to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure could take
numerous forms, but the simplest is likely the most preferable.
The text of Rule 37(b) could be amended to expressly include
Rule 26(c)(1) protective orders. Rather than declaring that protective orders fall within the category of "order[s] to provide or
permit discovery,"1'7 which this Comment argues they fundamentally do not, 76 the Rule should be changed to authorize
sanctions for violations of these protective orders in addition to
"order[s] to provide or permit discovery." The new Rule
37(b)(2)(A), as amended, could read:
(A) For Not Obeying a Discovery Order or Protective Order.
If a party or a party's officer, director, or managing agentor a witness designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a)(4)fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery, including an order under Rule 26(f), 35, or 37(a), or a protective
order under Rule 26(c)(1), the court where the action is
pending may issue further just orders.
CONCLUSION

Courts have analyzed the applicability of discovery sanctions to violations of protective orders in a number of ways. This
Comment argues that, because the Rule 26 Advisory Committee
Notes have not been given their due consideration, no court has

174 See Gunther A. Weiss, The Enchantment of Codification in the Common-Law
World, 25 Yale J Intl L 435, 509 (2000) (explaining the argument that codification means
"[fluture legislative reforms would be undertaken more easily and more effectively"). If
Congress were to pass legislation altering the enforcement of protective orders, the same
questions may arise about inherent powers filling in the gaps. However, the new legislation could theoretically supersede the inherent power to sanction if that were Congress's
stated intent. See Chambers, 501 US at 47, quoting Weinberger v Romero-Barcelo, 456
US 305, 313 (1982) (stating that "the exercise of the inherent power of lower federal
courts can be limited by statute and rule," but that the Court "'do[es] not lightly assume
that Congress has intended to depart from established principles' such as the scope of a
court's inherent power").
175 FRCP 37(b)(2)(A).
176 See Part III.A (analyzing the text of Rule 37(b) to argue Rule 26(c)(1) protective
orders are not "order[s] to provide or permit discovery" under Rule 37(b)).
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yet gotten the answer completely correct. Eschewing the extremes the courts have proposed to date, this Comment proposes
taking a middle path, arguing that protective orders are neither
categorically excluded from nor categorically included in the
Rule 37(b) sanctioning scheme. Instead, though traditional protective orders should be read as outside the scope of Rule 37(b),
the violations of certain protective orders-those that functionally mimic discovery orders-should be sanctionable under
Rule 37(b).
Such a reading would necessitate a temporary shift in the
authority used to enforce traditional protective orders. For the
time being, the inherent power to sanction could fill in the gap
left by a narrower Rule 37(b), though the inherent powers may
be more limited in some circumstances. While the full range of
sanctioning options under the inherent authority has been restricted by the Supreme Court in certain situations, Rule 37(b)
faces similar restrictions. Regardless of how adequate a substitute the inherent powers may be, there are numerous reasons
why codified sanctioning is preferable to relying on these unwritten rules. These include an increase in legitimacy, a greater
deterrent effect for potential violations, and more control over
the nature of protective order-violation sanctions going forward.
Thus, while transitioning to a temporary reliance on inherent
authority is the proper course of action, it is only a stopgap; it
would be ideal to amend Rule 37(b) expressly to include Rule
26(c)(1) protective orders, so as not to have to rely on the court's
inherent authority.
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